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Watching you, watching me: Liability for voyeurism when the 
voyeur is also a participant in a private act 
 
R v Richards [2020] EWCA Crim 95, Court of Appeal 
 
Key words – Voyeurism; secret filming of ‘private act’ by participant in the act; 
reasonable expectation of privacy 
 
Tony Richards (R) had filmed himself on his mobile phone having sex with two prostitutes, 
SD and JW, in their own bedrooms. The recordings came to the attention of the police whilst 
they were investigating R for possession of indecent photographs of children. The police had 
seized the phone and found the recordings, which the police suspected had been made 
without the consent of the women. R claimed that both women had agreed to being filmed 
and that he had paid more for the privilege. The two prostitutes contradicted his version of 
events. SD gave evidence that she enjoyed being filmed and charged more when being 
filmed; but on this occasion, she had not known about the filming and hence was not 
consenting to it. JW, on the other hand, did not agree to being filmed at all, as she was 
worried about recordings ending up on the internet.  
 
R was charged with two counts of voyeurism, contrary to s.67(3) of the Sexual Offences Act 
2003 (the 2003 Act). This provides that ‘a person commits an offence if (a) he records 
another person (B) doing a private act, (b) he does so with the intention that he or a third 
person will, for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification, look at an image of B doing the 
act, and (c) he knows that B does not consent to his recording the act with that intention.’ 
Section 68 of the 2003 Act adds that ‘For the purposes of section 67, a person is doing a 
private act if the person is in a place which, in the circumstances, would reasonably be 
expected to provide privacy.’ 
 
R appeared before HHJ Lloyd-Clarke and a jury at Cardiff Crown Court in July 2019. During 
the trial, R submitted that there was no case to answer to a charge under s.67(3) where R 
was himself a participant in the private act. This was rejected by the trial judge. The jury was 
directed to determine whether JD and SW were in a place which would provide a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and whether the acts of intercourse with R were ‘private acts’. R was 
convicted on both counts. R appealed, contending that JD and SW were not doing a ‘private 
act’ as far as he was concerned. He argued that they were not in a place which ‘would 
reasonably be expected to provide privacy’ from him, because he was not only in the same 
place (their bedrooms) with their consent but was participating in the allegedly private act. 
 
HELD, dismissing the appeal, that a defendant ‘can be guilty of an offence of voyeurism in 
relation to sexual activity in which he participated… It follows that section 67(3), which 
protects against the recording of another person doing a private act, is not limited to 
protecting the privacy of the complainant from secret filming by someone who was not 
present during the private act in question.’ 
 
Commentary 
As the New Zealand Law Commission put it, in their Study Paper, ‘Intimate Covert Filming’ 
[2004] NZLCSP 15, ‘covert filming of people in intimate situations violates the arguably 
fundamental desire of human beings to control exposure of their own body’ (at 2.10).  In 
Richards, the jury and the Court of Appeal were asked to decide whether it made any 
difference whether or not the person doing the ‘covert filming’ was simultaneously an active  
participant in the ‘intimate situation’. Put another way, could R say that JD and SW were not 
in a place which ‘would reasonably be expected to provide privacy’ at the time of the filming, 
purely because he was there too?  
 
The answer was ‘no’, and the Court of Appeal was undoubtedly correct to say so. The court 
in Richards derived substantial assistance from the decision in Bassett [2008] EWCA Crim 
1174, [2009] 1 WLR 1032. In that case, Hughes LJ, giving judgment for the Court of Appeal, 
drew a distinction between a person (V) being observed by another person (D) who chanced 
upon V in a ‘casual and unintended’ encounter, on one hand, and V ‘being spied upon’ by D, 
on the other hand. The former would not give rise to the offence of voyeurism, whereas the 
latter would do so. In other words, the fact that D observed V doing a particular act would 
only give rise to voyeurism in certain contexts.  
 
To illustrate his point, Hughes LJ suggested that people using changing rooms in public 
swimming baths ‘must expect to be observed unclothed, for some at least of the time, by 
other people who are also using the changing rooms’. This would not be voyeurism: ‘There 
is, in short, no reasonable expectation of privacy from casual observation by other changing 
room users’ (Bassett at [10]). Conversely, the same people in the same public swimming 
baths would ‘have a reasonable expectation of privacy from being spied upon by someone 
outside who has drilled a hole in the wall for the purpose’. This would be voyeurism. The 
case of Turner [2006] EWCA Crim 63, [2006] 2 Cr App R (S) 51, illustrates this proposition 
perfectly. The accused in that case, T, was a sports centre manager who was charged with 
voyeurism, to which he pleaded guilty. His offending came to light after a female customer 
who was taking a shower in the changing rooms noticed a displaced ceiling tile and a 
camera lens in the gap. T pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment, 
reduced to 9 months on appeal. 
 
Returning to Bassett, Hughes LJ continued his analysis by stating that: 
 
The question of whether the person observed had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy from the kind of observation which ensued is one for the jury in each 
case. We accept that that may well mean that in many cases the question of 
whether there is or is not a reasonable expectation of privacy will be closely 
related to the nature of the observing which is under consideration (Bassett at 
[11]; emphasis added). 
 
Applying this analysis to the situation in Richards, Fulford LJ emphasised the importance of 
context. He said: 
 
Whether a person is doing a private act in a place which, in the circumstances, 
would reasonably be expected to provide privacy will depend inevitably on the 
context… What occurred in the present case between [R] and the two women 
was a private act… There was a case for the jury to consider that this act of 
intimacy occurred in a place which, in the circumstances, would reasonably be 
expected to provide privacy from, for instance, a secret observer or a secret 
recording.  
 
This proposition – that participants in intimate sexual activity are reasonably entitled to 
expect privacy from a ‘secret observer’ – can be illustrated by a Canadian case, Keough 
2011 ABQB 312, a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta. In that case, the 
accused (K) had filmed a couple having sex in his spare bedroom. One of the participants 
knew about, and had agreed to, the filming; however, the other did not. K was convicted of 
voyeurism contrary to s.162 of the Canadian Criminal Code. This is worded in very similar 
terms to the 2003 Act. It provides, inter alia, that ‘Every one commits an offence who, 
surreptitiously, observes — including by mechanical or electronic means — or makes a 
visual recording of a person who is in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy’ (s.162(c)). It hardly needs saying that the same conduct in this 
jurisdiction would lead to a conviction under s.67(3) of the 2003 Act. 
 
Returning to Richards, Fulford LJ continued his analysis as follows (emphasis added): 
 
The presence of [R] as one of the participants in the intercourse does not lessen 
the reasonable expectation of privacy in this sense, namely that what occurred 
would not be available for later viewing, even if only by [R]… A person who is 
engaging in an act of sexual intercourse alone with another in a bedroom is 
engaged in a private act in a place which, prima facie, would reasonably be 
expected to provide privacy from secret filming on the part of the other 
participant. 
 
To reinforce this point, Fulford LJ cited with approval a hypothetical example provided by 
counsel for the Crown. In the example, a patient removes their clothes in the presence of a 
doctor. This would not amount to voyeurism (under s.67(1) of the 2003 Act). However, if it 
transpired that the doctor was secretly filming the patient, in order to watch the recording 
later for his own sexual gratification, then the offence under s.67(3) would have been 
perpetrated.  
 
Another case cited by Fulford LJ in Richards, but only in passing, was the recent judgment of 
the Canadian Supreme Court in Jarvis [2019] 1 SCR 488. In that case, the Supreme Court 
explained the meaning of privacy in the context of the voyeurism offence in s.162 of the 
Criminal Code. Wagner CJ (giving judgment on behalf of Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, 
Gascon and Martin JJ) said, albeit obiter: 
 
In my view, a typical or ordinary understanding of the concept of privacy 
recognizes that a person may be in circumstances where she can expect to be 
the subject of certain types of observation or recording but not to be the subject 
of other types. An obvious example is that of a person who chooses to disrobe 
and engage in sexual activity with another person and who necessarily expects 
to be observed by that other person while she is nude and engaging in that 
activity. Her privacy would nonetheless be violated if that other person, without 
her knowledge, video recorded the two of them engaging in the activity (para 
[38]; emphasis added). 
 
Although this was undoubtedly obiter (Jarvis involved a very different situation to the 
emphasised words in the above quote), the collective judgment of six members of the 
Supreme Court of Canada provides strong support for the decision in Richards. Moreover, 
there is further Canadian authority to back up the decision in the present case. In Mahabir 
2010 ONCJ, a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice, the defendant (M) was convicted of 
voyeurism and given a suspended sentence and probation for 18 months for surreptitiously 
videotaping consensual sexual acts in a Toronto hotel room in which he and the complainant  
(X) were participants. Although the couple had separated, and X was not only in a new 
relationship but engaged to be married, M persuaded her that he would have ‘closure’ if they 
had one last ‘romantic date’. She agreed to spend the night with him in the hotel, and to be 
blindfolded whilst they had sex. However, after about an hour, the blindfold slipped and X 
saw that M was recording her with a camcorder. She demanded that he hand over the tape, 
which he did, and she took it to the police. At the end of trial, De Filippis J convicted M of 
voyeurism under s.162 of the Criminal Code. 
 
Indeed, Richards is not even the first case involving this situation to have been dealt with by 
a court in England. In 2010, Benjamin Wilkins (W) pleaded guilty to 11 counts of voyeurism 
at Camberwell Magistrates’ court.  Five of those counts related to W having secretly filmed 
himself, using a camera hidden in a smoke alarm above his bed in his London flat, having 
sex with five different women. The camera was linked to a computer in his living room, which 
enabled W to transfer the recordings to DVDs. The offending came to light when W’s 
girlfriend found the DVDs hidden in the loft. The case was transferred to the Inner London 
Crown Court for sentencing. There, Judge Roger Chapple said that ‘Parties to consensual 
sexual activity give consent to sexual activity in privacy, not for their very private acts to be 
covertly filmed for your later gratification.’ 
 
Therefore, the law, both in this jurisdiction and in Canada, is now settled: a participant in 
intimate, sexual activity is reasonably entitled to expect privacy. That means that he or she is 
entitled not to be covertly or surreptitiously filmed either by a ‘secret observer’, as in Keough, 
or by the other participant, as in Mahabir, Wilkins and now Richards. 
